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Introduction 
The Kuwaiti crisis of 1990-91 radically changed the shape of oil 
politics. The OPEC cartel is now more divided then ever, and the 
conflict in the Gulf will have severe financial repercussions for the 
region's countries for a number of years to come. 
On a fairly obvious level the crisis tilted the balance between Iran 
and Iraq which had been heavily in Baghdad'sfavor towards Teheran. 
Clearly, it means that Iraq's prospects of becoming the first populous 
state in the Middle East to achieve a fully industrialized and diversified 
economic base are dashed for the foreseeable future. 1 Much less 
obvious are the ramifications for long run oil prices, and thus the 
economic position of the other Gulf countries. Not since the early 
1970s has there been more uncertainty concerning the economic fate 
of these nations. Already many of the countries have undertaken 
radical restructuring of their development plans, together with 
accompanying social and political strains. Whether or not many of 
these countries will be able to maintain stability, will depend on future 
developments in world petroleum markets. 
The main purpose of this paper is to gain some perspective on 
these issues by assessing the likely movements in world oil markets 
over the next decade. In doing so, the first part of the paper examines 
some of the patterns and longer run trends that characterized oil 
markets prior to the Iraqi invasion. The second part assesses the 
impact that developments since the liberation of Kuwait have had on 
these fundamental market dynamics. Based on these factors, the final 
section of the paper draws several conclusions concerning future oil 
1 John Roberts, War for Oil~ Enerr;y Issues and the Gulf War of 1991 (Boulder, Colorado: 
International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, Occasional Papers 
Number Thirteen, 1991), p. l. 
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prices and the distribution of economic power in the region. 
Key Factors Affecting the Price of Oil2 
After more than two decades3 of experience in forecasting prices 
and production levels, analysts have developed several general 
principles concerning the functioning of oil markets.4 One notable 
advance is that energy is no longer thought of as exempt from the laws 
of supply and demand. It was not very long ago that energy was 
viewed as a necessity and as such was unresponsive to price. Similarly, 
supply was thought to depend more on the whims of nature than on 
the ability to find and extract the mineral.!) 
The situation regarding demand before the Iraqi invasion 
contrasted sharply with the beginning of the decade. In the first 
quarter of 1981, world oil consumption was about 56 million barrels 
per day and the price of oil was $48.64 per barrel (in 1988 dollars). 
In the first quarter of 1988, world oil consumption was again about 56 
million barrels per day. Yet the price of oil had dropped to below $12 
per barrel despite worldwide economic expansion. 
Several studies have documented the events, market responses, 
and adjustments that contributed to these patterns:6 
1. The Ir~nian revolution and the onset of the Iran-Iraq War 
reduced world oil production between 1979 and 1981, 
pushing prices up. Because short-run oil demand is very 
inelastic (relatively price insensitive), the reduction in supply 
2 The following section draws heavily on Robert Looney "World Oil Market Outlook: 
Implications for Stability in the Gulf States" Middle East Review (Winter 1989/90), pp.30-39. 
'For an excellent overview and assessment of OPEC's attempts at coordinating policy and 
resolving conflicts see M.S. Ahrari, "Conflict Management of the OPEC States," Mediterranean 
Quarterly (Summer 1991), pp. 86-109. 
• Douglas Bohi, "Evolution of the Oil Market and Energy Security Policy," Contemporary 
Policy Issues Q uly 1987), p. 21. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See for example Samuel A. Van Vactor and Arion R. Tussing, "Retrospective on Oil 
Prices," Contemporary Policy Issues Quly 1987), pp. 1-19; Stephen P.A. Brown and Keith R. 
Phillips, "Oil Demand and Prices in the 1990s," Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review 
Qanuary 1989), pp. 1-10; Michael Olorunfemi and Maria Knob!; "OPEC's Experience in the 
1980s: Shaping its Strategies for the 1990s," OPEC Review (Spring 1991), pp. 1-12 Cyrus 
Bina, "Limits of OPEC Pricing: OPEC Profits and tke Nature of Global Oil Accumulation," 
OPEC Review (Spring 1990), pp. 55-74; Robert Bacon, "Modelling the Price of Oil," Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy (Summer 1991), pp. 17-34; and Klaus Matthies, "The OPEC After 
Thirty Years," Intereconomics (September/October 1990), pp. 253-256. 
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pushed prices sharply higher. 
2. The oil consumption and price combination that prevailed in the 
first quarter of 1981 could not be sustained in the longer run. In 
the absence of economic growth, a sustained price of $48.64 per 
barrel would eventually have reduced U.S. oil consumption by 
about 40 percent- from 16.5 to 10.2 million barrels per day. On 
the other hand, for U.S. consumers to continue to absorb 16.5 
million barrels per day without economic growth eventually would 
have required an estimated price of only $20.61 per barrel. 
3. U.S. consumers require nearly a decade to adjust fully to changes 
in oil prices. Oil consumption responds slowly to price changes 
because substantial changes in the ratio of oil consumption to 
output require new capital investment. 
4. As short run demand adjusted to prices during the 1980s, the 
market price and quantity of oil consumed were pushed down. 
Non-OPEC oil producers added to the downward pressure on 
price as their production decreased. Beginning in 1981, however, 
OPEC moderated downward pressure on prices by reducing its 
own prodµction. 
5. Nonetheless, short-run demand continued to decline and non-
OPEC oil production continued to rise. OPEC's continued 
attempts to support prices reduced its production to about 14 
million barrels per day by mid-1985, less than 50 percent of its 
total capacity. 
6. OPEC's attempts to support prices ended in a well-publicized 
failure. Excess capacity and the incentive for OPEC members to 
cheat on quotas led to a surge in OPEC production. With demand 
being inelastic in the short run, the surge in production caused a 
price break in late 1985 and early 1986. Thereafter, OPEC was 
unable to restrain its production sufficiently to drive prices back 
up to earlier levels. 
The above analysis indicates that consumption responds symmetri-
cally to rising and falling oil prices. Givedthis adjustment mechanism, 
the price of $15.47 per barrel in early 1989 would have eventually 
Volume 17, Numbers 3 & 4, Fall/Winter 1992 
276 Robert E. Looney 
increased U.S. oil consumption by an estimated 35 percent- from 17 
to 23 million barrels per day. On the other hand, for U.S. consump-
tion to remain at 1 7 million barrels per day, in the long run prices 
must rise to an estimated $26.63 even without economic growth. 
While longer run movements in oil price are easily explained in 
terms of market responses and adjustments over time, shorter run 
movements are still difficult to predict. In fact, it is fair to say that we 
have only begun to understand the mechanisms controlling month to 
month (or even year to year) changes in price. Even the dramatic 
fourfold increases in oil prices in 1974 and the threefold increase in 
1979 during a period of stable supply appear to defy the normal laws 
of supply and demand. It is now clear that inventory demand 
fluctuations set off by supply interruptions can contribute a great deal 
more to the shortage in the market and to the severity of the price 
shock than can the initial supply reduction. 
Similarly, we lack complete explanations of the price declines in 
January 1986 - not of why the price fell, but of why it took so long to 
happen and then fell so far. The downward pressure had been 
enormous for years, as world-wide consumption declined by 23 
percent between 1979 and 1985 and remained steady through 1985. 
Even the futures market anticipated a price decline for nearly three 
years before it occurred, as suggested by the discounts on long term 
contracts relative to shorter maturities during most of that time. Also 
indications now exist that the market was surprised by new information 
in January 1986. Saudi Arabia,announced its intention to increase 
production three months before the price drop, and OPEC failed to 
reach a new accord in light of the Saudi action one month before. 
The most popular explanation of recent oil price movements is 
that, beginning around 1972, OPEC began exerting its market power 
to control the world oil price.7 Certainly, OPEC possessed the 
potential market power to control the oil price: during most of the 
1970s, OPEC countries produced more than two thirds of total free 
world output and accounted for nearly 90 percent of all oil involved 
in international trade. Nevertheless, little evidence exists that OPEC 
exercised its market power. Political events, and not OPEC decision 
making, were the catalysts that initiated the two oil price shocks and, 
7 This interpretation is at best misleading and at worst simply incorrect. See for example: 
Mohammed Ahraari, OPEC: The Falling Giant (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky 
Press, 1986). 
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as noted, reductions in supply do not explain the price shock that 
occurred. 
OPEC production slowed8 slightly during the first three months 
of 1974 and again during the first three months of 1979. However, 
total OPEC production for 1974 matched that for 1973, and total 
production for 1979 exceeded that for 1978. What production figures 
from these two events do not reveal is the extent of the shortages 
caused by the demand side of the market, in particular, surges in 
inventory demand. 
Unfortunately, the extent of the inventory demand shock cannot 
be fully described because the only available inventory data refer to 
primary stocks in OECD countries and nearly all stocks held outside 
the OECD countries are unknown. Still, more than just anecdotal 
evidence exists to indicate that considerable hoarding occurred 
downstream from refineries. Immediately after the Iranian revolution 
began in October 1978, refined product stocks fell sharply in all OECD 
countries even though crude oil supplies and refining throughout 
continued unabated. 
Deliveries from refineries to downstream markets continued at an 
unusually rapid pace through the first three months of 1979 - indeed, 
too rapid a pace to be explained by a consumption increase - until the 
process finally slowed in mid-1979 and refiners began to rebuild their 
stocks. By this time, most of the price increase had already occurred. 
Refiners continued to build their stocks to record levels over the next 
12 months, and in prices offset this slow-down in consumption that 
would soon dominate the market. 
In short, past forecasting errors can be blamed partly on the one 
to two year lag in completing accurate data and the inventory 
adjustments underway in the oil market during this period. Long 
term trends were difficult to identify, much less to quantify. One thing 
is dear, however; the results of a sound projection methodology should 
be relatively insensitive to current events. In this light, it is interesting 
to compare various Department of Energy (DOE) crude oil price 
forecasts for 1990 with the average price for the year in which each 
report was prepared. 
In 1977, the DOE projected that oil prices in 1990 would average 
$24 - the same price level that prevailed in the year the forecast was 
made. In 1981, after prices had nearly d~mbled, the DOE projected a 
• The following is based on Bohi, op.cit., pp. 23-25. 
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nearly 50 percent increase during the following nine years. Subse-
quently, as current prices have declined, projected oil prices have 
declined even more rapidly. Projections made by Data Resources Inc., 
Chase Econometrics, Wharton and the other major forecasting services 
show a similar pattern.9 
Clearly, projecting oil prices, particularly specific figures for 
specific years, is highly speculative. More realistically it is better to 
view oil price movements as cyclical. In this regard, the rise and fall 
of oil prices from 1969 to 1986 is unlikely to be repeated in the 
extreme.10 The depths to which prices sank during the 1960s drove 
out most competing fuels. 11 When prices ascended a few years later, 
most fuel using equipment was designed to burn only a narrow range 
of petroleum products. In the short term, consumers had little choice 
other than to pay higher fuel prices. 
As time went on, however, consumers learned to conserve energy 
and adopted flexible burner tip designs. Worldwide, coal and gas 
consumption expanded while oil demand contracted. If historical 
experience is any guide to future behavior in global energy markets, 
the active presence of competing fuels again will tend to hold down the 
oil price cycle. In this event, competition among fuels will most likely 
prevent a complete collapse of oil prices. 
In wo.rld energy markets, oil penetrates very rapidly into the bulk 
fuel market when its price is less than $10 per barrel. Under such 
circumstances, global oil consumption could increase by 2-3 million 
barrels per day within a few months, largely at the expense of coal, 
and could continue to grow by as much as 5 percent per year as oil 
captured virtually the entire increment in world energy demand. 
Thus, oil prices below $10 are stable only if very substantial oil reserve 
discoveries occur, such as those that took place during the 1950s and 
1960s. 
On the other hand, competition among fuels prevents oil prices 
9 Samuel A. Van Vactor and Arion R. Tussing, "Retrospective on Oil Prices," Contemporary 
Policy Issues (July 1987), pp. 12-14. 
'
0 A view also put forth in George C. Georgiou, "Oil Market Instability and a New OPEC," 
World Policy journal (Spring 1987), pp. 295-312. See also Arion Tussing, "An OPEC Obituary," 
The Public Interest (Winter 1983), pp. 3-21; and Jahangir Amuzegar, "A World Without 
OPEC," The Washington Quarterly (Autumn, 19821, pp. 60-70. 
11 The following is based on Van Vactor and Tussing, op.cit., pp. 15-18; and Walter J. 
Mead, 'The OPEC Cartel Thesis Reexamined: Price Constraints from Oil Substitutes," The 
journal of Energy and Development (Spring 1986), pp. 239-42. 
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from sustaining a level much above $20 per barrel. In the longer 
term, coal from South Africa, Australia, the United States and other 
producing areas can easily be delivered into major European and 
Asian markets for $20 to $25 per barrel equivalent. Natural gas is an 
even stronger competitor. 
A final fact that we have learned from past experience is that day 
to day oil price changes are driven by Saudi Arabian production 
decisions more than by anything else. Since the drop in demand and 
price peak of 1981, oil prices could stabilize above their earlier levels 
only because the Saudis and a few other OPEC members were willing 
to decrease production to balance the market. In the summer of 1985, 
however, Saudi production had fallen to 2.5 million barrels per day--
about one half of the country's OPEC production quota and nearly a 
509 percent drop from the production levels of the summer before. 
The only way that the Saudis could restore their production and 
stem the erosion of their export revenues was to retreat on price. They 
did so through a set of complicated "netback" agreements that 
guaranteed profit margins to refiners buying Saudi crude oil. As they 
executed these agreements, Saudi officials warned that they were no 
longer willing to act as swing producer. Simply stated, the Saudis lost 
control of the marginal barrel of crude oil and thus the ability to set 
prices. ~ 
What does all this tell us about future Saudi policy over prices or 
output? As late as 1972, the major oil companies projected Saudi 
crude oil production potential in excess of 20 million barrels per day. 
Such an output is still possible, and the investment required to arrive 
at the production level is an order of magnitude lower than the cost of 
providing a similar increment in primary energy supply from any 
other set of resources. It is a reasonable assumption that the Saudis 
now realize that higher capacity levels should have been installed 
during the mid-l 970s to prevent the price run-ups of 1979 and 1980. 
(The Saudis themselves wittingly or unwittingly helped engineer those 
price increases by holding back on production). 
So long as Saudi Arabia's leaders are rational, they will price their 
energy just below the costs of their closest competitors. In the short 
run, that competition is from other sources of oil such as natural gas 
in North America and Europe, where the long distance transmission 
infrastructure is more than adequate to meet current demand. In the 
longer run, the competition is from coal' and new natural gas supplies, 
including the substantial cost of adding to transport capacity. Thus, 
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the most important determinant of oil prices in both the short and the 
long run should be competition among fuels in the bulk fuel market. 
Put another way, the marginal supplier of energy to the world will base 
its price on the marginal uses of energy and the marginal development 
costs of fuels competing in that market. 
Because the Saudi reserves are unlikely ever to be worth more 
than the value of substitute bulk fuels, the Saudis have little economic 
incentive to restrain development of their fields. In short, Saudi 
Arabia has both the incentive and the ability to meet the world's 
incremental energy demand through the rest of the century and at 
prices comparable to those that prevailed in mid-1986. 
In sum, the interpretation of oil markets put forth here assumes 
that: 
1. The tenfold increase in crude-oil prices during the 1970s can 
be explained by major shifts in market forces, without the 
need of a cartel theory. 
2. From 1980 through mid-1985, evidence of some cartel 
behavior appeared, including dominant producer(s) control 
over output. 
3. The ability of OPEC or dominant producers within OPEC to 
attain its (their) price objectives will continue to reflect the 
basic problems of a non-government enforced cartel - the 
strong incentives to agree and then cheat, the lack of any 
enforcement mechanism, and the fact that about 70 percent of 
world crude output is outside OPEC. These basic problems 
have not been eliminated by recent agreements. 
4. Higher oil prices have led consumers worldwide to conserve 
on their use of oil. This market mechanism will constrain 
future oil price increases. But in the early 1990s, crude prices 
must increase due to the non-renewable character of crude oil. 
5. The important and large scale immediate substitutes for oil, 
which led to oil price reductions in the mid-1980s and which 
will constrain future price increases, include large reserves of 
tar sands, heavy oils, coal and nuclear in electric power 
generation and wind energy conversion. These substitutes are 
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sufficiently large and low cost so as to be expected to prevent 
crude oil prices from again rising above approximately $20 
per barrel (1986 dollars) at least until 1993. 
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At the time just prior to the invasion of Kuwait, these general 
considerations lead to a likely price scenario whereby oil markets were 
assumed to continue the adjustments that began the early 1980s. This 
scenario assumed that oil markets had not yet completely adjusted to 
worldwide excess capacity in the producing countries, with the net 
result that prices and/or production levels will continue to fall in the 
early 1990s: By the mid-1990s: 12 
1. short-run demand was expected to increase from the unsus-
tainable combination of oil consumption and price that 
characterized the late 1980s and early 1990s. Adjustment was 
expected to be slow. Nevertheless, together with a growing 
world economy and low initial prices, the adjustment was 
thought to result in strong growth in oil demand from the 
mid-1990s onward. 
2. As a first approximation, given the low prices in the late 1980s, 
the growth rate in consumption was anticipated to begin to 
increase from around 2 percent per annum in the early 1980s 
to 9.5 percent by the end of the century. 
3. This rate of consumption can not be sustained throughout the 
1990s, however, since it would result in levels of demand 
greater than the world capacity to produce oil - little capacity 
is likely to be added with the low oil prices that will bring 
about the rapid growth in oil consumption. 
4. Clearly, given the demand they are likely to stimulate, 1989 
prices could not be sustained throughout the decade of the 
90s. Previous experience had shown that as OPEC is pushed 
to full capacity oil prices rise. 
5. Nearly all excess capacity to produce oil was in OPEC. Given 
a wide range of consumption scenarios, OPEC was expected 
• 
12 Following Browth and Phillips, op. cit., pp. 4-6. 
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to come close to full capacity between late 1992 and early 
1993. At or below a price of $25 dollars per barrel, OPEC 
could reach full capacity no later than early 1993. By that 
year a price of $25 per barrel could prove too low - if world 
capacity did not rise. 
6. Similarly, with world economic growth rates between 2.0 
percent and 3.0 percent, oil prices could reach $30 to $40 per 
barrel by the year 2000. 
Of course, these price forecasts are dependent upon a number of 
assumptions. If world capacity to produce oil is decreased, if OPEC 
restricts its production, if oil supplies are disrupted or if economic 
growth is stronger, oil prices will be higher. On the other hand, if 
world capacity to produce oil is increased, if economic growth is 
weaker or if energy taxation is increased, oil prices will be lower than 
those forecast above. 
The Future - as Seen Post-Invasion 
Clearly, OPEC was unraveling at the time of the Kuwaiti invasion: 
its discipline undermined by evaded quotas, declining output and 
international strife. But OPEC had been looking forward to a revival 
as its share of world oil production increased during the mid to late 
1990s. The invasion of Kuwait put such as revival into question. As 
the London Economist noted in August 1990, the invasion of Kuwait will 
most likely put an end to this scenario. According to the Economist: 13 
1. Developed countries will now favor supplies from outside the 
Gulf and alternatives to oil, such as natural gas. 
2. Conservation will also become more attractive, depressing 
demand. 
3. Even before the invasion a number of observers believed that 
because of worries about global warming and environmental 
damage, demand would be less than the consensus forecast. 
4. Worse than that, the Economist felt the Iraqi action would give 
13 
''The End of OPEC" The Economist (August 18, 1990), pp. 55-56. 
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a boost to non-OPEC exploration. OPEC supply should also 
increase. Before the invasion, Cambridge Energy Research 
Associates had predicted that OPEC's large producers would 
add about 7 million b/d of extra capacity over the next five 
years - roughly matching the increase in expected demand. 
Unless producers cut their investment, the world may again 
find that capacity in the Gulf outstrips demand. If so, disci-
pline over production looks a more futile ambition than ever. 
283 
On the other hand, the Economist felt that a price war was 
unlikely since, although the three big Gulf producers - Saudi Arabia, 
Iran and Iraq - have plenty of reserves to increase production, they 
could ill afford a collapse in the world oil price. All should be desper-
ate for money. Iran and Iraq need money to repair war damage. 
Saudi Arabia's falling oil earnings caused it to run up budget deficits 
totalling more than $90 billion in 1983-89. 
Presumably the net effect of these forces would be to usher in an 
era of relative price stability in the forceable future. This view was 
more formally elaborated by Daniel Yeargin a year after the inva-
sion.14 According to Yeargin this period of calm for oil producers and 
consumers will result because:15 
1. The United States, along with some coalition partners, has 
assumed an explicit role in assuring the secure flow of oil and 
that certainly affects the orientation of the oil exporters. 
OPEC, as always, reflects the balance of interests and power 
among its members. 
2. Saudi Arabia is more dominant among the exporters than 
ever. Committed to moderate prices and stable supplies, it has 
no doubt that its fortunes depend on the Western economies; 
and with a quarter of proven world reserves it wants to be 
assured of a long-term market. 
3. At the same time, the crisis demonstrated that Saudi security 
is entwined with the West. But the Saudis' strategy is not 
14 Deniel Yergin, "Less Oil Politics and More Oil Business," International Herald Tribune 
(August 5, 1991), p. 6. 
15 Ibid. 
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much different from that of most other exporters who have 
much greater respect for the power of the marketplace today 
than in the era of nationalism. They have learned that 
customers count and they want to demonstrate they are 
reliable suppliers. Even Iran is showing some stirrings in that 
direction. 
4. The economic imperatives of the 1990s also are pushing the 
exporters toward a new flexibility. With the question of 
sovereignty over oil resources resolved in their favor, they are 
now preoccupied with more pragmatic and acute needs -
chiefly foreign capital and technology. 
5. They need more income from oil just to keep up with their 
rapidly growing populations. And since they are unlikely to 
gain more revenue from much higher prices (because they will 
lose customers) they need to pump more oil. And that requires 
new investment in exploration and production capacity. 
6. How will they pay for it? There is a general expectation of a 
capital shortage in the 1990s. So one place oil exporters will 
look for investment funds is in the once banished foreign oil 
companies. As a result, doors that slammed shut with nation-
alization in the 1970s will swing open again in the 1990s, and 
companies will find themselves exploring and producing in 
territories they never expected to see again. 
7. In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, attention has actually 
shifted away from the Middle East toward the former Soviet 
Union, which will become a more important, if uncertain 
factor in international oil. If a secure contractual basis can be 
established with western oil companies, several of the former 
Soviet Republics may in some degree help balance the world's 
dependence on Middle East oil. 
8. The biggest battle over oil in the 1990s may not even concern 
producing countries directly, but will be the struggle within 
the industrial countries over energy needs and environmental 
values. It could turn out that Am~rica's "energy strategy" is 
actually embodied in initiatives such as the 1990 Clean Air Act. 
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9. Whether economically correct or not, there is an unprece-
dented state and federal effort to regulate into existence a 
market demand for alternatives to gasoline, challenging the 
basic role of oil. The petroleum industry is anticipating a huge 
bill for the new environmental investments. Perhaps oil 
demand, not oil supplies, will be the big question in this 
decade. 
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CompoundingOPEC's problems was a new interest and advocacy 
on the part of industry leaders in the West in encouraging their 
governments to pursue policies undermining what remained of OPEC 
solidarity. In several cases, these views seemed to reflect official 
government policy. For example, Edward Morse, the influential 
publisher of Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, argued that: 16 
1. The main problem of the oil market is that it is the largest 
segment of international trade without any clear rules. The 
result has been imbalance, disruption and price shocks. 
2. What should be done is simple: the world's largest oil consum-
er and importer, the U.S., and the largest exporter, Saudi 
Arabia, can build a new oil regime by taking painless actions 
that serve both their own and global interests. And in the 
aftermath of the Gulf War they have a remarkable opportunity 
to do so. 
3. The two countries can start by negotiating a bilateral agree-
ment based on a concept the Saudis have already proposed by 
urging that "reciprocal security" should be the cornerstone of 
oil relations. In return for even modest demonstrations of 
good will, the Saudis promised that consumer nations could 
gain access to a "fairly priced ocean of oil." After a war that 
demonstrated our good will, we should not wait any longer to 
pursue this. 
16 Edward L. Morse, "How to Make OPEC Obsqlete" New York Ti1111!5 (July l, 1991), p. 
All. A more radical view is given in M.A. Adelman, "Oil Fallacies" Foreign Policy (l 991), pp. 
3-16. A critique of Professor Adelman's ideas is given in Peter Passell, "Cheap Oil, Expensive 
Cartel," The New York Tif11115 (March 20, 1991 ), p. C2. 
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4. The agreement could begin with plans for energy cns1s 
management, building on an agreement to store Saudi oil in 
the U.S., both under Saudi control and also leased cheaply to 
the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. For the Saudis, this 
would be a safe and inexpensive way to store oil. It would also 
demonstrate the kingdom's commitment to U.S. energy 
security and provide a steady outlet for production. 
5. In return, the accord would grant U.S. oil companies long-
term access to Saudi oil, with contracts offering American 
companies the equivalent of equity ownership for that oil. 
6. Why would the Saudis reopen their oil sector? It would 
provide the money they need for postwar reconstruction in 
the region. Moreover, it would symbolize the commitment to 
supply oil over the long term. Though these arrangements 
would lead to more diversity in the Saudi industry, it need not 
reduce government control. 
According to Morse: 
1. The key problem of oil instability stems from the large-scale 
nationalization of oil reserves in the 1970s. Since then, oil 
companies have lost access to long-term supplies and need to 
invest and rely upon high cost oil outside of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting countries. For their part, the big 
monopoly producers like Saudi Arabia, with insecure outlets, 
disrupt the market with their search for buyers. 
2. Eventually, the bilateral agreement could be opened to others, 
with the Saudis signing similar agreements with Japan and 
The European Community, and the U.S. negotiating with 
other large exporters. 
3. Building new international institutions would not require the 
dismantling of OPEC or the international Energy Agency. Yet 
it could eventually supercede both, providing the basis for a 
General Agreement of Petroleum and Petroleum Products, 
much as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
emerged from bilateral trade agreements built on reciprocity 
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and the extension of most favored nation treatment to many 
countries. 
4. This agreement would address short-term energy insecurity 
and crisis management. It would subject oil to a free market 
regime needed for long-term stability, providing predictable 
prices to the Saudis and reasonable prices to American 
consumers. Over time it would create a more sensible way for 
the world to manage its oil relationships without forcing oil 
exporters to give up control over their own resources. 
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This new aggressiveness on the part of consumers was further 
refined by Professor M.A Adelman of MIT.17 Adelman's argument 
is that the right price for the industrial countries to pay for oil is the 
lowest price that would assure an adequate supply for the foreseeable 
future. And that, he maintains, is $6 to $10 per barrel. His calculations 
throw some light on current policy questions. 
1. His estimates for OPEC make clear that most of the cash going 
to oil exporters is pure windfall. Squeezing the cartel would 
thus not be likely to reduce the supply. 
2. By the same token, his calculations suggest the magnitude of 
economic waste created by OPEC's continuing financial gap. 
High prices have created perverse incentives to drain America 
first: if Mr. Adeleman's numbers are correct, little or none of 
the billions of dollars spent annually on oil development in 
North America could be justified in purely economic terms. 
Implied here is a point often (correctly) made by environmental-
ists: the ecological damage from burning carbon fuels - local air 
pollution, global warming - ought to be factored into the price at the 
pump. As Passel notes18 "What they rarely acknowledge, though, is 
that OPEC already assesses a 'carbon tax' that triples the price of 
crude. Washington does have an oil policy. The only catch, it seems, 
is that the policy is made in Houston and Riyadh". 
While none of Mr. Morse's (or Adelman's) proposals have been 
17 M.A. Adelman, "Oil Fallacies" Foreign Policy (February 1991), pp 3-16. 
18 Peter Passel, op.cu. 
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implemented, at least in the United States, there are indications the 
Europeans are taking them seriously - especially the idea of imposing 
a "carbon tax": 19 
1. A carbon tax is already being used in some Nordic countries 
and is now proposed for Europe-wide application. The 
announced intent of the tax, which is based on the carbon 
content of fossil fuels, is to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, 
a gas said to cause global warming. 
2. Under study by the European Community since last fall, the 
carbon tax proposed by the European Commission would start 
next year at $3 a barrel for oil, rising to $10 by the year 2000. 
There is also increasing evidence that the industrial countries are 
simply bypassing or even ignoring OPEC in designing their future 
energy policies. This is most evident in several oil agreements currently 
under discussion. These do not even mention the OPEC countries:20 
1. If all goes according to plan, around 50 countries will sign by 
mid-summer 1992 an energy treaty that will define market 
conditions for trade in oil and gas between the former 
Communist bloc and the rest of the Western industrialized 
world. The proposed treaty does not ask the OPEC countries 
to join. 
2. Everything will be covered in the accord and protocols, from 
investment protection to exploration rights, trade dispute 
settlement, repatriation of profits and the environment. At the 
United States' and Germany's assistance the main thrust of the 
draft text is the legal protection of foreign investments. 
3. Although the will is obviously there, most Western oil compa-
nies have been cautious about rushing to invest in the repub-
lics of the former Soviet Union because of the political 
uncertainty. The main thrust of the draft treaty text currently 
19 James Tanner "OPEC Ministers Will Discuss Taxes, Not Crude Prices," The Wall Street 
journal (April 23, 1992), p. Al 0. 
20 Hillary Clarke, "Oil: Bypassing OPEC," The Middle East (March 1992), pp. 30-31. 
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on the table is the legal protection of foreign investment, 
including safeguards in the event of war or re-nationalization 
programs. 
4. In the short-term one of the most important political effects of 
the Charter will be to rule out the likelihood of any of the 
producing republics from joining OPEC - the market access 
clause of the text currently under discussion specifically rules 
out any price fixing or production quotas. 
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Clearly a significant factor for the future is the likelihood that 
Russia and several of the former Soviet Republics may, with the aid of 
foreign investment and technology, reverse the downward trend in 
production to become significant exporters.21 The Soviet's oil prob-
lems never really involved lack of reserves: low investment, poor 
technology and inefficiency were always the main constraint on output 
- these may be overcome quickly once the expected boom in foreign 
investment begins. 
Against this background, problems within OPEC were coming to 
the fore: 22 
1. Quotas were last formally agreed by OPEC at its July 1990 
meeting, on the eve of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As a result 
of the cessation of exports from· Kuwait and Iraq during the 
Gulf crisis, the other members of OPEC allowed themselves to 
increase production to make up for the shortfall. 
2. At its meeting in Vienna in November 1991, the organization 
agreed to permit the members to continue lifting as much 
crude as they could produce. The ceiling of 23.5 million b/d 
agreed upon at the September ministerial meeting was simply 
rolled over. It seemed a sensible arrangementat the time since 
oil prices were averaging $23 a barrel, Kuwaiti production was 
only just beginning to trickle back onto the market and no 
compromise seemed in sight on allowing Iraq to resume 
. 
21 Leyla Boulton, "The Lure of Oil's Final Frontier," The Financial Times (March 6, 1992), 
p. 15. 
22 
"OPEC: Saudi Arabia Tak.es Charge" The Middle East (February 1992), pp. 24-25. 
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exports. 
Unfortunately for OPEC, prices started to fall: 23 
1. First the winter growth in demand for OPEC oil peaked too 
soon as the oil companies built up inventories quicker than 
they needed to . The recession in the Western industrialized 
world turn out to be deeper than expected, resulting in a 
depressed demand for oil, dampened all the more because of 
a relatively mild winter. 
2. Kuwait has started to resume production faster than was 
believed possible. And Iraq was edging its way slowly towards 
an agreement for the resumption of oil exports at a value of 
$1.6 billion a year to pay for "humanitarian"needs. 
Little wonder that OPEC members who rely for their oil revenues 
more on the price than the volume of crude they export were worried. 
Even before the end of 1991, Algeria and other members were 
agitating for an energy meeting of the Organization. Saudi Arabia 
would have nothing to do with the idea. The fact that Algeria, Libya, 
Nigeria and Venezuela began reducing output unilaterally indicated 
that the kingdom had the correct negotiating stance.24 Clearly: 
1. Saudi Arabia was unwilling to relinquish the 35% of its share 
of OPEC's overall market for crude exports. 
2. It boosted production from 5.4 million b/d before the Gulf 
crisis to 8.5 million b/d at considerable expense and would not 
make a deal which did not permit the maximum degree of 
flexibility. 
Future issues: 
1. The fundamental issue of reintegrating Iraq and Kuwait into 
the OPEC marketing structure had to be addressed on a 
serious level. 
"Klaus Matthies, "Oil Price Surprises" /nlerecorwmics (March/April 1991), pp. 49-50. 
2
• "OPEC: Saudi Arabia Takes Charge" op.cit. 
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2. OPEC was in danger oflosing its credibility as a crisis-manage-
ment organization by failing to think far enough ahead. 
Short-run market crises were still dictating oil prices. 
The Future Seen as the Dust Settles 
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The first real glimpse into the medium term future was provided 
at the mid-February 1992 OPEC meeting. This meeting satisfied none 
of the members. At that time:2.5 
1. A fragile consensus on output was reached, only to be instantly 
denounced by its two strongest signatories (Iran and Saudi 
Arabia). 
2. Oil prices continued their seasonal slide as the market contin-
ued to remain unimpressed by the proposed cutbacks. 
3. The price weakness reflected a number of problems stemming 
from oversupply and the worldwide recession. In contrast to 
the 1980s, however, these difficulties were exaggerated by 
Saudi Arabia's reluctance to make short-term output adjust-
ments. 
The February 1992 OPEC agreement and aftermath was very 
important because it set the tone (apparently for some time) of Saudi 
Arabia's approach towards pricing:26 , 
1. Under the official agreement Saudi Arabia would have to cut 
to 7.9 million b/d as part of an overall ceiling of 22.5 million 
b/d to 22. 7 million b/d. The Saudis plan to violate the agree-
ment by staying with their 8 million b/d. 
2. Saudi Arabia spent $US 5 billion during the Gulf war to boost 
its production from 5.4 million b/d to close to 9 million b/d in 
January 1992. At the same time, the Saudis increased their 
market share in OPEC to 35 percent. The kingdom is clearly 
•• Peter Kemp, "Saudis Stand Firm as Oil Prices Sijde" Middle East Economic Digest (April 
3, 1992), pp. 9-10. 
26 Deborah Hargreaves," A Deal that Fails to Heal Divisions" Financial Ti111'1s (February 18 
1992), p.17. 
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unwilling to relinquish its hard won market share. It also faces 
a budget deficit of some $8 billion which restricts its ability to 
maneuver. 
3. The kingdom's insistence on maintammg its large share of 
overall output will inevitably bring it into conflict with smaller 
producers. All OPEC member nations are suffering the effects 
of low oil prices, most have budget deficits and most have 
based their economic plans (for 1992) on a price closer to $20 
a barrel than the current (early 1992) level of $17. 
4. Some members such as Algeria, which is under emergency 
rule, and Venezuela, which recently suffered an attempted 
government overthrow, are pressed by political unrest at home 
which has partially been caused by lower oil revenues. In 
spite of paying lip service to smaller producers' concerns, 
Saudi Arabia has reasserted its dominance over the discordant 
producers' club. Its assertive role is increasingly mapping out 
a future for OPEC. 
5. One significant achievement at the meeting long sought after 
by the Saudis was a move away from historical production 
quotas to allocate output more closely in line with individual 
countries' capacity. 
6. However, this presents an opportunity for new disagreements. 
The danger of using production capacity as a basis for 
allocating output levels is that countries have a tendency to be 
over-optimistic in their assessments of their ability to pump oil. 
In addition the new system will formalize Saudi Arabia's 
increased clout within the organization. 
7. Iran and several other producers are already fighting to 
reverse the move and return to historical quotas which were 
in place before the Gulf war. The country has called for a 
return to the quotas as soon as Iraq is able to re-enter the 
export market. 
8. Iraq is currently barred from exporting oil by United Nations 
sanctions and its production allocation under the arrangement 
The journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 
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is for domestic consumption only. However, by early 1992 the 
country was capable of producing 2 million b/d. 
9. Kuwait has said its output will reach 900,000 b/d in June, 
rising to 1.5 million b/d by the end of the year. If the return 
of the two countries to full production is not to plunge the oil 
market into crisis, other members will have to agree to 
significant cuts. 
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On the other hand, despite the disagreements, the spirit of 
cooperation in OPEC is not completely dead. The more generous 
producers: the UAE, Venezuela, Libya and Qatar all agreed to cut 
production by more than the average 9 percent required under the 
arrangement in order to compensate the disadvantaged smaller 
producers. 
There are also a number of indicators as to what the longer term 
will hold. The Geneva meeting made it clear that Saudi Arabia will 
demand that any agreement on overall quotas must take into account 
its need for a 35 percent market share and minimum of 8 million b/d. 
Saudi Arabia's aim at the OPEC meeting was to eradicate the last 
vestiges of the 1990 agreement and the quota shares - especially the 
kingdom's 22.1:5 percent share implied in the agreement. It is clear 
that:27 
1. The Saudis were trying to establish new principles to run the 
organization - if there are to be future production cuts then 
they must be pro-rated for all members. 
2. The Saudis want to get such a system in place before Iraq 
resumes exports and Kuwaiti production recovers to its pre-
war level. 
3. It is clear that the Saudis hope that whatever depths current 
prices sink to, the relatively low prices will help the world 
economy towards recovery and lead eventually to stronger 
demand for oil. 
Clearly time is on the Saudi side: 
.,., Kemp, op.cit. 
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1. Capacity utilization in early 1992 was running at dose to 90 
per cent and as output declines in the US and the former 
Soviet Union, the kingdom is the only one of the world's three 
biggest producers which is expanding production. 
2. Saudi production capacity will probably increase to 10 million 
b/d by 1995 under the current Saudi Aramco development 
program and bolster the kingdom's clout in output. 
3. Capacity enhancement programs in Abu Dhabi, Iran and 
possibly Kuwait are far less ambitious or advanced. 
4. Cash concerns intensified by the low oil prices are constraining 
the pace of development in several producing states and 
transforming attitudes toward foreign oil companies. Algeria, 
Iran and Iraq are all seeking foreign investment in upstream 
development, overturning a long tradition of avoiding outside 
advances in their need for development capital. 
In sum, if OPEC states have a shared interest at present, it is their 
common need for cash. However, hopes of securing higher prices are 
being undermined by the collective reluctance to consider deeper cuts 
in production. Saudi Arabia in particular is determined to set the tone 
for OPEC's future and will not trim output again, only to see others 
reap the rewards of higher prices. 
For most observers the change in oil market attitudes is proving 
to be of far greater interest than the latest disagreement between 
OPEC members over precise production levels. The market is starting 
to reflect a "new psychology." It is now starting to focus on underlying 
economic realities rather than reacting to developments on the basis of 
fears about the security of supplies. On the basis of underlying realities 
events are not moving OPEC's way over the short term. 
Clearly oil production quotas are a thing of the past. They were 
never strictly observed anyway and, even as the organization reintro-
duced them later in 1992,28 it is dear that quotas will not be more 
than a more than a cosmetic cover to disguise the policy differences 
28 Neil Buckley "Once Again OPEC She>Jts Itself in the Foot," The Financial Times 
(September 22, 992), p. 30. 
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which have divided the member countries since the mid-1980s.29 In 
fact when the issue of quotas was discussed at the September 1992 
meeting of OPEC ministers it became so combative that one of the 
founding members, Ecuador, concerned over its quota, withdrew from 
the organization. This move has led to speculation that other member 
countries may find the burden of belonging to the cartel outweighs the 
profit.50 
The Longer Term 
In light of the previous discussion, it is interesting to re-read a 
longer term forecast made by The Economist on the eve of the invasion 
of Kuwait. In its assessment of OPEC to the year 2000 the Economist 
concluded that:31 
1. At the end of the twentieth century, OPEC will have about 
four fifths of the world's oil reserves. 
2. The main cause of OPEC's problems in the 1980s was OPEC's 
spare producing capacity of 8 million to 10 million barrels a 
day. 
3. For the.future, non-OPEC producers have little capacity. If 
demand continues to expand, the cartel's surplus will disap-
pear in 10-15 years. 
On the other hand, a number of factors will continue to check 
demand: 
1. The amount of oil the OECD countries need to generate each 
extra dollar of GDP is still falling, despite lower prices. In 
1983-85 it fell by 40%; in 1985-87 it fell by another 5%; and it 
fell again in 1988. 
2. Conservation is one reason for this decline. Investments made 
to conserve oil are still coming on-stream. They include 
29 
"OPEC: Saudi Arabia Takes Charge" op. cit., p. 25. 
30 Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Departure of Ecuador0 The Symbol for OPEC of a Decade in 
Decline" International Herald TribuTU1 (September 19-20, 1992), p. I. 
""OPEC 2000" The Economist (February 4, 1989), pp. 17-19. 
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energy-efficient factories, houses and forms of transport that 
will continue to depress demand well into the next century. 
3. The conservation effort is likely to intensify. Once scornful 
governments are now taking seriously ecologists' warnings 
about the environmental damage caused by burning fossil 
fuels; no longer is talk about global warming, the ozone layer 
or acid rain confined to conservationists. Conservation is now 
widely seen as the cheapest way to cut consumption and 
reduce the damage done by fossil fuels. 
4. Developing countries are unlikely to offset the conservation of 
the industrial countries. Third World energy demand has 
risen in the 1980s by an average of 2 1/4 percent per annum 
in part because many poor countries cannot afford new fuel 
efficient machines and transport. But the developing world 
accounts for only 20% of global oil use. In the year 2000, it is 
estimated that up to a third of its energy will still come from 
non-commercial sources, like firewood, while foreign currency 
shortages will constrain oil imports. All in all, a boom in oil 
demand led by the Third World looks like a remote prospect. 
From this, one can easily assume prices are likely to remain weak 
for the remainder of this century. Unless supplies are seriously 
disrupted by wars or other unforeseen events, the price of OPEC's oil 
is unlikely in any year to average more than $20 a barrel (in 1992 
dollars) - most likely once Kuwait and Iraq come on stream it will be 
considerably less. 
Conclusions 
Before drawing any conclusions concerning future developments 
on oil markets or the stability of OPEC and its members, one should 
heed the advice of Daniel Y eargin:32 
Recent history shows that just when calm is taken for granted, 
some new surprise, mixing politics and economics, comes 
along and shakes all assumptions. Even now one can see the 
possible elements of a surprise during the next two or three 
'
2 Yeargin, op.cu. 
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years. The world is producing oil near the limits of capacity, 
meaning that there is little room for error. 
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From the vantage point of late-1992, it is interesting to note that 
the pre-invasion market mechanisms outlined above still seem to be in 
effect. Also the forecasts derived from these frameworks are still 
essentially on line - at least for the trend. In a general sense, it 
appears that all the invasion did was push the timing forward a few 
years - the invasion and subsequent liberation of Kuwait do not appear 
to have fundamentally altered these mechanisms or the scenarios they 
imply. 
If anything, the invasion appears to have postponed the time when 
OPEC will likely regain some control over oil prices:33 
1. The Persian Gulf war has accelerated the trend away from oil 
and further undermined OPEC cohesion. Germany, Japan 
and to a minor extent the United States have increased taxes 
of petroleum products, which will tend to restrain demand. 
The growing strength of the environmentalist movement has 
spurred the trend toward greater energy efficiency and the 
replacement of oil with abundant natural gas. 
2. The post-invasion mini-oil shock reinforced the determination 
of oil buyers to seek supplies from less volatile areas; i.e., 
outside the Middle East. The pace of oil (and gas) exploration 
in the North Sea is at an all-time peak and similar activities are 
taking place in West Africa, South America, and in other 
Third World countries. 
3. The application of new technology has enhanced the probabili-
ty of successful finds at lower cost as well as boosting recovery 
from existing wells. 
4. Joint ventures between Western oil companies and producers 
in the former Soviet republics should, over time, reverse the 
downward trend that began in 198834 
• 
"Eliyanu Kanovsky, "Don't Prop up the OPEC Cartel," The Wall Street journal Qune 18, 
1991), p. A20. 
,. Leyla Boulton, 'The Lure of Oil's Final Frontier" The Financial Times (March 6, 1992), 
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5. Probably the single most important factor depressing oil prices 
will be the financial troubles of the major Middle Eastern oil 
exporting countries. Even before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia's military budget was huge - the equivalent of 
about 20 percent of its GNP in I 984-88. The war added 
enormously to military outlays. Saudi Arabia's request for 
many billions of dollars of U.S. military equipment and its 
plans to expand its armed forces presage a major increase in 
its military outlays in the coming years. 
6. Looming on the horizon is the reentry of Kuwait and Iraq into 
the oil markets. Both countries have vast petroleum reserves 
and pressing financial needs. They are even less likely than 
before the war to adhere to OPEC quotas. Iran with its 
economy shattered by the revolution and its eight-year war 
with Iraq has announced ambitious development goals. Higher 
oil exports are essential. 
7. Kuwait in particular is lobbying for a much larger oil produc-
tion quota.35 Kuwait's determination will most certainly clash 
with Saudi Arabia's high level of production and with Iraq's 
eventual return to world oil markets as an exporting nation. 
Kuwait says it badly needs the money to make up the losses 
from the war which cost it $65 billion and cut deeply into its 
assets of nearly $100 billion. The Kuwaitis say that with 
planned expenditures of $8 to $10 billion over two years they 
will further raise output to 2 million barrels a day by the end 
of 1992. Kuwait's output was 1.5 billion to 2 million barrels a 
day before the Iraq invasion of August I 990. 
8. The extensive loans Saudi Arabia has contracted from interna-
tional and regional banks reflect the financial predicament 
faced by its government. Its leaders fear that higher prices will 
trigger strong countervailing forces which will in a few years 
depress prices; i.e.,· a repetition of the boom and bust of the 
I 980s. Hence the Saudi policy of attempting to enhance its oil 
PP· 15. 
55 Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Kuwait Seeks to Raise Oil Output" The New York Times (April 20, 
1992), p. c2. 
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revenues not by higher prices, but by exporting a larger 
volume of oil. 
9. The announced expansion of capacity by Abu Dhabi, Iran, 
Venezuela and Nigeria as well as by smaller exporters will 
surely add to the downward pressure on prices. The historical 
record shows that the greater the idle capacity the stronger the 
tendency to cheat on quotas. 
10. The recent oil finds in Yemen may be sizable.36 
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